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Abstract 
The US-China game of Renminbi (RMB)/US Dollar exchange rate has aroused increasing 
attention recently. From the US perspective, appreciation of RMB exchange rate could reduce 
the US-China trade deficit, boost the US economy and thus lower the unemployment rate (Cheng 
and Zhang, 2012). Therefore it is crucial for the US government to figure out whether there is an 
influence from US political pressure on RMB flexibility and the most effective way to accelerate 
the appreciation of RMB exchange rate. Aminian et al (2008) believed that US political pressure 
may be one of the causes for the appreciation of RMB exchange rate, while Liu and Pauwels 
(2012) stated that there is no significant impact from external political pressure on RMB 
exchange rate. Previous studies only examined the impact of one aspect of US political pressure 
on the RMB exchange rate. That’s why the conflict appears. This paper will fill in the gap of 
previous literature and resolve the conflict by investigating the impact of US political pressure 
from three aspects, namely, from US Congress, the US public media and from US lobbyists. This 
paper finds that the political pressure from Congress and the US public media alone have little 
impact on the RMB exchange rate in the short run, while the political pressure from US lobbyists 
has a positive impact on the appreciation of RMB exchange rate. By recognizing this, the US 
government could reinforce the lobbyist way to accelerate the appreciation of RMB exchange 
rate effectively.  
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The appreciation of Renminbi exchange rate has aroused increasing debate in recent years. The 
US always considered the Chinese government a currency manipulator because of the Chinese 
de facto pegged exchange rate regime. In other words, China has conducted a relatively fixed 
exchange rate policy. On one hand, the US urged the Chinese government to revalue and 
accelerate the appreciation of RMB exchange rate in order to reduce the US-China trade deficit 
gap, boost the US economy and thus lower the unemployment rate (Cheng and Zhang, 2012). On 
the other hand, the Chinese government had little change in its exchange rate policy because they 
were afraid that the value of the US national bonds they bought would shrink in the process of 
appreciation (Liu, 2011). Although China reformed its exchange rate policy in 2005 from US peg 
regime (fixed exchange rate regime pegged to US Dollar) to a basket-targeting policy (floating 
exchange rate policy referring to a variety of weighed foreign currencies), the fluctuation of 
RMB exchange rate is still limited, since keeping the RMB exchange rate at a low level is a 
major driving force to maintain a substantial trading export amount (Sato et al, 2012). So the US 
has exerted a great amount of pressure on accelerating the RMB exchange rate in order to narrow 
the US-China trading gap (Liu and Pauwels, 2012). The RMB exchange rate has appreciated by 
around 25 percent since its reform in 2005 (Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2012). The question is whether the 25 percent appreciation of RMB since 2005 is the 
result of the US government’s effort. 
Newspapers and politicians assume that US political pressures have an impact on the 
RMB exchange rate. Some politicians criticize Obama’s government as not tough enough to 
exert pressure on RMB appreciation, while others claim that the 25 percent appreciation of RMB 
since 2005 is the contribution of the US government’s effort. Aminian et al (2008) believe that 
the US political pressure may be one of the causes for the appreciation of RMB exchange rate. 
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However, Liu and Pauwels (2012) state that through the empirical study on the daily exchange 
rate of RMB, there is no significant impact from external political pressure on RMB exchange 
rate. Also, Hufbauer and Brunel (2008) believe that the US legislation alone can have little 
influence on appreciating RMB exchange rate because China’s government has a strong power 
in intervening and controlling the fluctuation of RMB exchange rate. So two positions conflict 
with each other on whether there is an actual influence.  
This is an important issue that arouses increasing attention. If US political pressures have 
no impact on RMB exchange rate, it makes no sense for the US government to exert political 
pressure on China’s currency. Nevertheless, if there does exist an impact from US political 
pressures on RMB exchange rate, the US government should implement more political pressure 
to achieve the appreciation of RMB in their favor. 
Previous studies only examine one aspect of the impact of US political pressure on the 
RMB exchange rate. That’s why the conflict appears. Although Liu and Pauwels (2012) do 
examine those three parts, they fail to use proper sources and indices for those aspects. 
According to their work, data resources for US Congress and lobbyists are all from newspapers, 
which are not a reliable and stable database to resort to. Also Liu and Pauwels (2012) use times 
of US-China meeting as an index of lobbyist activity, which is not convincing enough. Those 
two defects make the final results and finding of their paper unconvincing. 
This paper will fill in the gap of previous literature and resolve the conflict problem by 
investigating the impact of US political pressure from three aspects, namely, from US Congress, 
US public media and from US lobbyists. This paper finds that the US political pressure from US 
Congress and US public media alone have little impact on the RMB exchange rate in the short 
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run, while the political pressure from US lobbyists has a positive impact on the appreciation of 
RMB exchange rate. 
Basic Concepts 
The Flexibility of RMB Exchange Rate 
There are four types of indices related to RMB exchange rate. The first index is the spot 
value of RMB exchange rate. The second indicator is the Non-Deliverable Forward (NDF) price 
of RMB. The RMB NDF can be used as a proper indicator for the expectation of RMB exchange 
rate because it is exchanged in Hong Kong, which is an off shore market without regulation by 
the Chinese government (Liu & Pauwels, 2012). The third measurement for RMB exchange rate 
flexibility is the weight change in the currency basket since the currency basket is a variety of 
weighed foreign currencies. The more diverse of the currency basket, the more flexible the 
currency regime is. The first three methods focus on the fluctuation of the currency value or on 
the weight change in the currency basket. Both aspects look at only one side of the RMB 
flexibility. The forth method is “exchange market pressure” (Frankel, 2009). Frankel (2009) 
presents a new method to measure the flexibility of RMB exchange rate that could overcome this 
downside. He introduces a new indicator called “exchange market pressure”, which combine 
both the fluctuation and the weigh change together to create a new measurement for RMB 
flexibility. 
US Political Pressure  
Different authors have different understandings and use different indicators to measure 
the US political pressure on RMB appreciation. However, each author examines only one aspect 
of the political pressure and assumes it to represent the whole picture of the political pressure, 
which makes their conclusions unconvincing and quite different from each other. To investigate 
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the political pressure from a comprehensive view, this paper sums up the political pressure into 
three aspects. The first aspect of the political pressure is from US Congress. From 2003, different 
political swings in US Congress have had a consensus on urging China to appreciate its currency 
(Hufbauer & Brunel, 2008). The number of sponsors supporting the “Currency Exchange Rate 
Oversight Reform Act of 2011” was 19, which amounts to the second highest number of sponsor 
among the 112 Congress public bills related to China (The US-China Business Council, 2011). 
The second aspect of political pressure is from public media. According to Frankel and Wei 
(2007), political pressure can be reflected by the number of reports appearing in newspapers that 
the US governors urge China to accelerate the RMB flexibility. Also Liu and Pauwels (2012) use 
the similar data collecting method. They recorded the number of headlines which have RMB 
appreciation keywords and used the number as an indicator of US political pressure. The US 
political pressure index Liu and Pauwels (2012) created include two aspects: one is from US 
Congress bill. The other is from the number of meetings between China and the US. But since 
their sources are all from newspapers, I categorize their method into public media influence. The 
third political pressure is from US lobbyists. Aminian et al (2008, 2012) believe that the major 
US political pressure is from lobbyists.  
The Influence of US Congress on RMB Exchange Rate 
The US legislation alone can have little influence on appreciating RMB exchange rate. In 
the Fall 2003, there was an increasing trend of political pressure from US Congress targeting the 
appreciation of RMB exchange rate. Although different swings of political parties in Congress 
disagree with to what extent should the pressure be and who is in charge of supervising those 
pressures, all of them agreed on the urgent need to push China to accelerate its exchange rate 
(Hufbauer & Brunel, 2008).  
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The legislation alone can have little influence on appreciating RMB exchange rate 
because China’s government has a strong power in intervening and controlling the fluctuation of 
its currency. The control mainly aims at protecting China’s export industries and at maintaining 
US-China trade surplus (Cheng and Zhang, 2012). Another reason is that if the RMB exchange 
rate appreciates, the real value of US debt will decrease. However, the Chinese government 
bought a huge amount of US bonds. In order to prohibit the devaluation of US debt, the Chinese 
government strictly controls the RMB exchange rate (Liu, 2011).  
The effect of US Congress bills on the appreciation of RMB exchange rate is more like 
“turning the screw rather than slamming the hammer” (Hufbauer & Brunel, 2008; p.226). 
Screwing means long-term, slow effort on the RMB appreciation, while slamming indicates 
short-term sudden effect. By examining three major Congress bills related to the Chinese 
currency, Hufbauer & Brunel (2008) find that the bills focused on the long-term oversight of 
China’s behavior on revaluing RMB exchange rate rather than on the short-term action to 
suddenly punish or to prevent the RMB’s misalignment. That’s why the US Congress alone has 
little direct influence on the RMB revaluation. 
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Figure1: The Monthly RMB exchange rate from 2011 to 2012 
Note: Source from Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (2012). Historical rates for the 
Chinese Yuan Renminbi. Available from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat00_ch.htm 
 
The above graph shows the tendency curve of monthly value of RMB exchange rate from 
May 2011 to October 2012. I will now examine how the RMB exchange rate behaved before and 
after the main Currency Act related to China during 2011and 2012. By October 4th, 2012 there 
were four major Congress bills about China’s currency. One of them “Currency Exchange Rate 
Oversight Reform Act” passed the Senate in October 2011. So I list the RMB exchange rate data 
for five months before and after the passing. We can find that this curve has three stages. The 
first stage is from May 2011 to December 2011, when the RMB exchange rate was appreciating 
at a slow speed. The second stage is from December 2011 to July 2011, when RMB was 
depreciating. The third stage is from July 2011 to October 2012, when the RMB exchange rate 
appreciated dramatically. Therefore December 2011 and July 2012 are the turning points in this 
curve. However, none of them match the passing date of the Act. Also we can find that the curve 
slope remains unchanged from August 2011 to December 2011, which shows that the tendency 
of RMB appreciation did not change two months before or after the passing date. Thus the 
influence of US Congress bill has little impact on the fluctuation of RMB exchange rate. This 
method just roughly shows the tendency of the fluctuation. It did not exclude the impact of 
significant domestic news in China. Liu and Pauwels (2012) exclude that impact from the 
fluctuation of RMB and investigate the impact of US congress on RMB. They find little evidence 
to support a significant impact from the US congress to RMB exchange rate, which is consistent 
with my conclusion.  
The Influence of Public Media on RMB Exchange Rate 
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The political pressure appearing on public media has little influence on the fluctuation of 
RMB exchange rate. The political pressure from public media is different from public media 
pressure. Political pressure from public media means the urges or demands from US officials, 
who appear on public media. Normally, to simplify data collection, authors use newspapers as a 
representative of public media. For instance, Frankel and Wei (2007) measure political pressure 
from the public media aspect. The index use is the number of reports that appear in newspapers, 
in which the US officials urge China to accelerate RMB flexibility. However, public media 
pressure means any pressure or attack reported by the newspaper. It includes not only the 
pressure from US governors but also from other entities. In some cases, it just reflected the 
stands or perspective from the journalists or certain medias. For example, Liu and Pauwels 
(2012) record the number of headlines, which have RMB appreciation keywords. They use the 
number as an indicator of US political pressure.  
Both the political pressure from public media and the public media pressure hardly have 
any significant effect on the appreciation of RMB. According to Frankel and Wei (2007), the 
political pressure from public media could lower the proportion of US dollar in the currency 
basket while it could hardly influence the currency policy on RMB revaluation. In other words, 
their results shows that there is little evidence to support the influence of political pressure from 
public media on the fluctuation of RMB exchange rate. Moreover, the empirical evidence from 
Liu and Pauwels (2012) shows that the public media pressure has little effect on the daily return 
of RMB exchange rate. Those empirical findings act as strong evidence to support the idea that 
the political pressure from public media has little influence on the fluctuation of RMB exchange 
rate. 
The Influence of the US Lobbyists on the RMB Exchange Rate 
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US lobbyist activities have a direct impact on the origin and an indirect impact on the 
acceleration of RMB appreciation. Firstly, the lobbyist activities from the US Treasury Act as a 
driving force to persuade China to start RMB exchange rate flexibility. Frankel and Wei (2007) 
find that there were meetings between US Treasury Secretary and Chinese officials, where the 
US Treasury Secretary tried to persuade the Chinese government to promote the RMB flexibility. 
From Figure2, as found in Frankel and Wei (2007), we can tell that the difference between spot 
rate and forward rate flipped its sign in October 2003, turning from the forward discount to the 
forward premium. Frankel and Wei (2007) found that the flipping sign time fit the time, in which 
the US Treasury’s persuading effort, during September and October of 2003.  
 
Figure2 Prices of NDFs Around the Time Official US Pressure Began 
Note: Source from Frankel, J. A., & Wei, S. (2007). Assessing china's exchange rate regime. Economic 
Policy, (51), 575. doi: http://www.economic-policy.org/  
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Secondly, US lobbying could indirectly accelerate the appreciation of RMB exchange 
rate. Aminian et al (2008, 2010) built a theoretical political model concerning the US political 
pressure and the RMB exchange rate. Their results show that an increase in US political pressure 
on China would lead to an appreciation of RMB exchange rate. In other words, appreciation of 
the RMB exchange rate is partly due to the external political pressure from the US. However, we 
cannot arbitrarily conclude that political pressure from the US lobbyists has a significant direct 
impact on the appreciation of RMB, since no empirical evidence as of now supports this 
conclusion. Some indirect evidence indicates that there may be an indirect and long-term impact. 
Evidence shows that US-China meetings have a negative relationship with the volatility of RMB 
exchange rate, but have a positive relationship with the RMB NDF rate. (Liu and Pauwels, 2012). 
Those empirical results imply that the interaction between US and China may enhance the 
market’s expectation of the RMB appreciation, raise the flexibility of RMB exchange rate in the 
future and increase the possibility of its appreciation. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, the US political pressure from both Congress and the US public media have 
little impact on the RMB exchange rate, while US political pressure from lobbyists do have a 
significant influence on the appreciation of RMB exchange rate. There are two prospective 
aspects for future work. All the political pressure in this paper is short-term pressure. So 
although in the short run US political pressure has little impact on the RMB exchange rate, there 
may be a significant impact in the long run (Liu and Pauwels, 2012). This is a prospective aspect 
for future work. Also, the united effort from US and European countries may have a significant 
impact on accelerating the flexibility of exchange rate policy (Hufbauer & Brunel, 2008). 
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